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PUTTING MELENDEZ-DIAZ ON ICE: HOW
AUTOPSY REPORTS CAN SURVIVE THE
SUPREME COURT’S CONFRONTATION
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Taceant colloquia. Effugiat risus. Hic locus est ubi mors gaudet
succurrere vitae. 1

INTRODUCTION
Were the Medical Examiners (“MEs”) of the United States
like Dr. House on a Tuesday, 2 we would have many things to be
†
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respective expertise, and, without whom I could have never understood the
important practical implications of this issue. Many thanks, as always, to my
parents, to Maria, to Megan (again) and to Christian for their extraordinary
patience, understanding and support.
1
This popular slogan that adorns morgues around the world, see, e.g., Margaret
Graham,
Morgue
2
(photograph),
FLICKR
(Apr.
10,
2006),
http://
www.flickr.com/photos/drexelmedarchives/3404963652/ (belonging to DrexelMed
Archives’ Photostream), roughly translates from Latin to English as, “Let
conversations be silenced. Let laughter take flight. This is the place where death
takes joy in helping the living.” Id. (author’s translation). The National Association
of Medical Examiners uses the last sentence as its subtitle on its website, see NAT’L
ASS’N OF MED. EXAM’RS, http://thename.org/ (last updated Mar. 2, 2011), but the
entire quote is used more often, see, e.g., Thomas A. Godwin, End of Life: Natural or
Unnatural Death Investigation and Certification, 51 DISEASE-A-MONTH 218, 219
(2005).
2
Based on the following exchange between the popular television
characters of Dr. Gregory House and Dr. Lisa Cuddy in the episode titled
“Autopsy”:
Dr. Gregory House: Is it still illegal to perform an autopsy on a living
person?
Dr. Lisa Cuddy: Are you high?
Dr. Gregory House: If it’s Tuesday, I’m wasted.
Dr. Lisa Cuddy: It’s Wednesday.
Memorable Quotes for “House M.D.” Autopsy (2005), THE INTERNET MOVIE
DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0606012/quotes (last visited Apr. 3, 2011)
(quoting House: Autopsy, (FOX television broadcast Oct. 7, 2005)). This serves to
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concerned with, including their state of mind and adherence to
procedure.
As a group of professionals, though, MEs are
organized 3 and have produced training, educational, and
examination standards. 4 They have also produced performance
standards outlining and defining the many important tasks they
perform, especially forensic autopsies. 5 They are a highly trained
subset of the population that performs the difficult but fulfilling
task of providing an individual’s final medical examination so
that his or her survivors can have the closure that comes with
learning, to the degree that medical certainty permits, how their
relative, loved one, or colleague came to pass. When the death
leads to the filing of criminal charges, MEs will often testify to
their findings and share parts of their reports for the prosecution.
Like other professionals, though, many MEs move, change
jobs, and change careers; like all people, they also die. A criminal
investigation, the filing of charges and a trial can take months,
even years, exponentially increasing the likelihood that the ME
on a case will be unavailable to testify or will have had a
The current legal
significant change in circumstances. 6
landscape creates a zone of uncertainty for how the autopsy
reports that MEs produce can be used in criminal trials at which
they cannot be present, for any of the aforementioned ordinary
occurrences in people’s lives. The Supreme Court’s Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, culminating in the recent decision of
highlight the overexaggerated fictionalization of physicians and law enforcement
agents our society has become acquainted with through television programs like
House, CSI, Bones, and NCIS. The characters are presented in a way that drives
drama and plot development, not in a way that presents the realities of medical and
forensic work.
3
See General Information, NAT’L ASS’N OF MED. EXAM’RS (Jan. 15, 2011),
http://thename.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=29.
4
For requirements to become board certified in both a primary specialty and a
subspecialty see AM. BD. OF PATHOLOGY, BOOKLET OF INFORMATION 2011, 3–12,
available at http://www.abpath.org/2011BookletofInformation.pdf. The requirements
to become a board-certified forensic pathologist specifically include “[One] full year
of additional training in forensic pathology in a program accredited for such training
by the [Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education].” Id. at 7.
5
See generally GARRY F. PETERSON & STEVEN C. CLARK, NAT’L ASS’N OF MED.
EXAM’RS, FORENSIC AUTOPSY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (2006), available at
http://thename.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=18&Ite
mid=26.
6
This Note uses the term “unavailable” in the general sense and not in
reference to the “unavailability” that the Federal Rules of Evidence require for
certain hearsay exceptions. See FED. R. EVID. 804 (definitions of unavailability and
hearsay exceptions requiring that the declarant is unavailable).
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Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 7 has pressed a more exacting
lens on such a situation by analyzing the constitutionality of
admitting forensic evidence in the absence of the analyst who
prepared the report. 8 While there is significant uncertainty
about whether or not this applies to autopsy reports and about
how to handle forensic evidence, with minor adjustments either
by the MEs or by the courts, the majority of any autopsy report
should be admissible without the testimony of the pathologist
who performed the autopsy. Ideally, the ME would be present to
testify, but in the event that he or she is unavailable—through
change of job, relocation, sickness, or death—large portions of the
report should still survive admission, because they fall outside
the Court’s definition of the “core class of testimonial
statements,” 9 and, if a court does not agree, it can always redact
portions from the report to remove any “testimonial”
characteristics. 10
This Note examines how the Supreme Court’s holding in the
Melendez-Diaz case has impacted autopsy reports as evidentiary
tools in criminal cases. Part I offers some background on autopsy
reports and forensic pathology, discusses key evidentiary rules,
and the history of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
leading up to Melendez-Diaz. Part II explores the breadth and
consequences of Melendez-Diaz, particularly as they impact
autopsy reports. Part III analyzes how autopsy reports differ
fundamentally from many other types of forensic reports, notably
because of policy issues they implicate. Finally, Part IV defines
and presents the “lean rule” as an alternative for MEs and courts
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). The Supreme Court has signaled that Melendez-Diaz is
here to stay by granting certiorari to a Confrontation Clause case only one term
after it decided Melendez-Diaz, vacated the judgment of the Virginia high court in
that case and remanded it “for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion
in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.” Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316, 1316
(2010).
8
To the author, this issue initially appeared to be hypothetical, but I attended a
homicide trial in the course of my research and heard one City ME testify on behalf
of a Fellow, who, after her year at the program elapsed, moved out of state to become
an ME in another jurisdiction. Given the requirement of one year of “additional
training,” this issue would seem to arise regularly. See supra note 4. This only
heightens the importance of finding a solution that addresses the evidentiary,
constitutional, and practical issues at play.
9
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
10
See People v. Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d 38, 42, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846, 862 N.Y.S.2d
450, 453 (2008) (holding an autopsy report with opinions redacted was not
testimonial).
7
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alike that does not implicate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
interests, that provides the prosecution with facts and
observations that can still be used should the particular ME be
unavailable, and that allows MEs to continue performing their
duties in a relatively uninterrupted fashion.
The interests at play here are fundamental to the
preservation of constitutional liberties on the one hand, and to
our system of justice, our understanding of the world, and our
very humanity on the other hand. In crafting a solution, due
consideration must be paid to both sides. Constitutional liberties
necessarily run up against the interests of the State. 11 But those
liberties were derived from an order of natural law, 12 which, in
the case of an autopsy report, runs them up against individuals,
that is, the families and loved ones of the deceased, who hope for
the peace and closure of a final pronouncement on the matter.
This tension—weighing the interests of individuals against one
another rather than the individual’s interest against that of the
State—upends standard constitutional analysis and demands
bespoke treatment. While this tension is not an issue for many
outputs of forensic analysis, autopsy reports inhabit a liminal
locus, between life and death, between science and art, and in
that place, they require understanding and consideration as
forensic reports, as public records, as evidence, and as the final
punctuation on a person’s life.
I.

EXAMINING THE USE OF AUTOPSY REPORTS IN CRIMINAL
CASES

An autopsy report and the testimony of the ME can serve as
evidence for some of the more obvious parts of the prosecution’s
case, but because of the burden the prosecution must bear, the
evidence that the report and the ME can provide for those
elements is crucial. While MEs generally cannot speak to the
mens rea, actus reus, or concurrence, 13 they can generally offer
evidence of causation—that the actus reus lead to the decedent’s
11
See David Lombard Harrison, The USA Patriot Act: A New Way of Thinking,
An Old Way of Reacting, Higher Education Responds, 5 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 177, 179
(2004).
12
See Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1, 8 n.46 (2008).
13
This is qualified because it is possible that, outside of their capacity as MEs,
they might witness the actual crime or have a relationship with the defendant that
allows them to speak to her intent.
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death—and of the ultimate harm—that the deceased is, in fact,
deceased. 14 Taking the example of a basic shooting: The ME
would not likely testify as to whether the defendant shot the
decedent, whether the defendant intended to harm the decedent,
or whether the defendant actually intended to shoot the
decedent. The ME would likely testify to the fact that a bullet
caused the trauma that led to the death of the decedent and that
the decedent was dead. These seem to be obvious findings that
any reasonable person could come to, but when the hypothetical
becomes more complex and the decedent is in very frail health,
falls down the stairs, hits his head, has a heart attack, and is
shot by three shooters in different parts of his body, the entire
case may hinge on the findings of the ME as to the paths of the
various bullets and what actually brought his life to an end. 15 To
better frame the important role that autopsy reports play, this
section will explore the make-up of an autopsy report, the
Federal Rules of Evidence as they apply to the characteristics of
an autopsy report, and the history of the Supreme Court’s
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
A. Anatomy of an Autopsy Report
The National Association of Medical Examiners defines an
autopsy as “[a]n examination and dissection of a dead body by a
physician for the purpose of determining the cause, mechanism,
or manner of death, or the seat of disease, confirming the clinical
diagnosis, obtaining specimens for specialized testing, retrieving
physical evidence, identifying the deceased or educating medical

14
For a review of the elements of a crime, see generally JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 9, 10, 14, 15 (5th ed. 2009). A death certificate
can also serve as evidence of the decedent’s demise, see DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, MEDICAL EXAMINERS’ AND CORONERS’
HANDBOOK ON DEATH REGISTRATION & FETAL DEATH REPORTING 2 (2003)
[hereinafter MED. EXAM’RS’ & CORONERS’ HANDBOOK], available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/hb_me.pdf (“[I]nformation in the record is
considered as prima facie evidence of the fact of death . . . .”), but the information on
it is derived from the same source as the autopsy report and exists in a less
contextual format, so it should be subject to the same criticisms and the same
protections as the autopsy report.
15
For a less complex, but equally demonstrative, situation, see Katie Zezima,
Death of Father of Ice Skater Is a Homicide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A18
(explaining the ME’s ruling of a homicide, despite his finding of a pre-existing
cardiac condition, which the family blames for his death).
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professionals and students.” 16
MEs approach their
responsibilities at two levels: the jurisdictional question of
whether they should investigate the death further, and the
operational question of whether an autopsy ought to be
performed. Investigations should be initiated in all cases where
jurisdiction is granted “by statutes, rules, and regulations,” and
in cases “[that] should receive further investigations to protect
the public safety and health.” 17 Forensic autopsies ought to be
performed for any of a dozen reasons, including if “the death is
known or suspected to have been caused by apparent criminal
violence . . . [, and] the body is unidentified and the autopsy may
aid in identification.” 18 In these situations, “the public interest is
so compelling that one must always assume that questions will
arise that require information obtainable only by forensic
autopsy.” 19
For the purposes of this Note, several portions of an autopsy
report are of particular interest: the identification of the
deceased, the cause of death, the manner of death, and the
addenda that often accompany the report—usually in the form of
diagrams, photographs, and audio-video recordings. 20 While
these merit additional consideration, it is important to note that
the rest of the report is filled with background information like
the time, date, and location of the autopsy, along with any
medical history that can be compiled, and numerous descriptions,

PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 19.
Id. at 2 (enumerating eight particular scenarios that require further
investigation: “deaths due to violence[,] . . . known or suspected non-natural
deaths[,] . . . unexpected or unexplained deaths when in apparent good
health[,] . . . unexpected or unexplained deaths of infants and children[,] . . . deaths
occurring under unusual or suspicious circumstances[,] . . . deaths of persons in
custody[,] . . . deaths known or suspected to be caused by diseases constituting a
threat to public health[,] . . . deaths of persons not under the care of a physician”).
18
Id. at 3–4 (noting that the other ten reasons are: “the death is unexpected and
unexplained in an infant or child[,] . . . the death is associated with police
action[,] . . . the death is apparently nonnatural and in custody of a local, state, or
federal institution[,] . . . the death is due to acute workplace injury[,] . . . the death is
caused by apparent electrocution[,] . . . the death is by apparent intoxication by
alcohol, drugs, or poison[,] . . . the death is caused by unwitnessed or suspected
drowning[,] . . . the body is skeletonized[,] . . . the body is charred[,] . . . the forensic
pathologist deems a forensic autopsy is necessary to determine cause or manner of
death or collect evidence”).
19
Id. at 3.
20
For a complete list of the content and format of an autopsy report see id. at
18.
16
17

CP_Tsiatis (Do Not Delete)

2011]

PUTTING MELENDEZ-DIAZ ON ICE

7/14/2011 4:22 PM

361

interpretations, and opinions qualified as necessary. 21 The
discussion of these more basic pieces is limited because they are
the building blocks that lead to the report’s conclusions. The
conclusions are what make autopsy reports so vital to families, to
the public, and to prosecutors. The cause of death and manner of
death are generally included on death certificates, 22 and are used
as the basis for statistical reporting. 23 These rulings can impact
insurance claims, settlement of the estate, and closure for the
family of the decedent. 24 The rulings are a significant purpose of
the autopsy, but their use in a criminal trial, at which the ME
who performed the autopsy is not present, is questionable under
the latest interpretation of the Confrontation Clause to come
down from the Court. Therefore, a sound understanding of each
element of an autopsy report is necessary to explore how it may
fit into the Court’s current regime.
Identification of the body is often achieved by a visual
identification or by a comparison of dental records, fingerprints,
X-rays, or DNA. 25 Throughout their examinations, MEs remain
attentive to features, such as tattoos and scars, that can help
confirm the identity of the deceased, even if there is a
presumptive or visual identification. 26 MEs must also carefully
preserve the evidence through photographs, X-rays, 27 and
documentation of the deceased’s “clothing and personal effects,”
all with the purpose of avoiding exhumation if the identification
is challenged. 28 The thoroughness of this identification process,
which applies with equal force to individuals found with their
driver’s licenses and to those found only as skeletal fragments in
a swamp, ensures that presumptions are kept to a minimum.

See id.
See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. STANDARD CERTIFICATE OF
DEATH (1989), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/std-dcrt.pdf.
23
See MED. EXAM’RS’ & CORONERS’ HANDBOOK, supra note 14. Statistical
reporting, besides providing a measurement of recent trends, “is used to determine
which medical conditions receive research and development funding, to set public
health goals, and to measure health status at local, State, national, and
international levels.” Id.
24
See id. at 2, 24.
25
See PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 5.
26
See id. at 8.
27
See id. at 5–6. X-rays are important to “document skeletal characteristics and
radio-opaque foreign bodies such as bullets, pacemakers, and artificial joints.” Id. at
6.
28
Id. at 6.
21
22
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While MEs will generally not expend efforts beyond what seems
necessary to arrive at the conclusion, they will retain and
document the evidence in their report that will allow them—or
another party—to corroborate their conclusion should it be called
into question after the body proceeds to its final resting place. 29
Cause of death and manner of death are distinct conclusions
that serve different purposes. Cause of death is “[t]he underlying
disease or injury responsible for setting in motion a series of
physiologic events culminating in death,” 30 for example, “cardiac
arrest due to coronary artery atherosclerosis.” 31 Cause of death
outlines a detailed mechanism and sequence by which the death
occurred. Manner of death, on the other hand, is designed to
simplify the result, “classifying deaths based in large part on the
presence or absence of intent to harm, and the presence or
absence of violence, the purpose of which is to guide vital
statistics nosologists to the correct external causation code in the
International Classification of Diseases.” 32 In contrast to cause of
death, which covers expansive areas of medical science and has
numerous permutations of sequence, the options for manner of
death are limited to “natural, accident, homicide, suicide,
undetermined, and in some registration districts for vital
statistics, unclassified.” 33 Again, the details discovered through
the autopsy and catalogued in significant detail throughout the
report culminate in these two findings, with the goal of capturing
in a summary what category the death falls into and the steps
through which it occurred. That said, both of these pieces are of
a different character than the rest of the report; the National
Association of Medical Examiners distinguishes between “the
objective forensic autopsy with its findings including toxicological
tests, special tests, microscopic examination, etc., and . . . the
interpretations of the forensic pathologist including cause and

See id. at 5–6 (“Careful preservation and archiving provide an objective basis
for future identification and thereby avoid the need for exhumation.”).
30
Id. at 19.
31
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING
THE CAUSE-OF-DEATH SECTION OF THE DEATH CERTIFICATE (2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/blue_form.pdf.
32
PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 20. “Manner of death” specifically
assists: “1) in determining accurate causes of death, 2) in processing insurance
claims, and 3) in statistical studies of injuries and death.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 31.
33
PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 20.
29
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manner of death.” 34 This characterization is crucial in discussing
the potential admissibility of autopsy reports without the
presence of their preparers, and will be explored in greater detail
below.
Finally, the numerous addenda that may accompany an
autopsy report deserve mention. Diagrams, photographs, and/or
audio-video recordings often accompany the report and serve as
evidence at trial. 35 They provide important supporting evidence
to corroborate the written descriptions and the ultimate findings
of the report. Photographs and audio and visual recordings can
also confirm procedure and reported observations. Together,
these addenda perform several functions: “to support or refute
interpretations, to provide evidence for court, and to serve as a
record.” 36 As with the evidence amassed and preserved for the
identification of the deceased, these additional pieces can retain
detailed data that can preserve some level of independent review,
although that review must be, in almost every case, short of
actually performing a second autopsy.
This basic understanding of the key elements of an autopsy
report permits a more comprehensive evidentiary and
constitutional analysis of autopsy reports. Before arriving at the
constitutional question of confrontation, it is important to take
the pieces of the autopsy report that have just been introduced,
plug them into the existing evidentiary framework, and explore
their interaction with the justice system.
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence
In analyzing whether an autopsy report or a particular
element of an autopsy report is testimonial, evidentiary
underpinnings frame the analysis—although they ultimately
operate in concert with the constitutional issues to be discussed
below. In particular, the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding
hearsay, expert testimony, and exceptions to hearsay are vital to
any discussion of the Confrontation Clause questions that are
raised.

34
35
36

Id. at 18.
Id. at 10.
Id.
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The Federal Rules of Evidence devote an entire article to
hearsay. 37 Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”38
The Rules consider hearsay in such detail because it raises the
judicial issue of trustworthiness, 39 and because it raises the
constitutional issue embodied in the Confrontation Clause. 40
Because the declarant is not present on the witness stand, there
is often no way to judge whether the statement reported by the
witness was the declarant’s actual statement or whether the
statement was actually a true and credible statement. Similarly,
there is usually no way to confront the declarant when the
witness speaks for him or her.
Although the hearsay rule and hearsay exceptions provide a
foundational basis for understanding the Confrontation Clause’s
place in gathering testimony as evidence, hearsay evidence does
not always violate the Confrontation Clause. As the Court held
in California v. Green, “merely because evidence is admitted in
violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the
automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been
denied.” 41 The converse holds as well: Confrontation rights are
not exhaustively protected by hearsay exceptions, specifically
because hearsay is not a constitutional principle and its
definition and exceptions are based in statute. 42 Green identified
the relationship between hearsay and violations of the
Confrontation Clause as overlapping, but not completely; 43
therefore showing that just because a hearsay exception applies
does not automatically prove that the right to confront has been
satisfied. That said, the interplay between hearsay and the

See FED. R. EVID. 801–07.
Id. 801(c).
39
See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (“The hearsay rule,
which has long been recognized and respected by virtually every State, is based on
experience and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be
presented to the triers of fact.”).
40
See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (“The primary
justification for the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of any opportunity for the
adversary to cross-examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is
introduced into evidence.”).
41
399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
42
Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1436 (1966).
43
399 U.S. at 156.
37
38
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Confrontation Clause has led to the development of some of the
hearsay exceptions. The long and intertwined history of the two
provides a frame of reference for measuring evidentiary issues. 44
The hearsay rule is notably porous; it has twenty-nine
exceptions in the Rules. 45 Several of these exceptions might
apply to an autopsy report or portions of the autopsy report,
notably, as a record of regularly conducted activity, 46 as a public
record or report, 47 as a record of vital statistics, 48 as a recorded
recollection, 49 or under the residual exception. 50 These can be
separated into three distinct groups: exception as a business,
public, or medical record; exception as a recollection that
captures the ME’s impressions; and exception in the interest of
justice.
The business record, public record, and vital statistics
exceptions touch on one another in the case of an autopsy report.
An autopsy report satisfies the requirements of a business record
as a report of opinions and diagnoses, “made at or near the time
by . . . a person with knowledge, . . . kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and . . . it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the . . . report.”51 This
can be confirmed by the custodian, a qualified witness, or by
certification under the Rules or a relevant statute. 52 The rule
includes an expansive definition of “business,” 53 seemingly
leaving this exception open to broad interpretation. The public
records exception also seems to cover autopsy reports by
excepting reports of public offices “setting forth . . . the activities
of the office . . . [or] matters observed pursuant to duty imposed
by law as to which matters there was a duty to report.” 54 The
rule does not allow law enforcement personnel’s reports to escape
categorization as hearsay under the public record exception, 55 but
See, e.g., Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899) (dying declaration
exception).
45
See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807.
46
See id. 803(6) (business record exception).
47
See id. 803(8).
48
See id. 803(9).
49
See id. 803(5).
50
See id. 807.
51
Id. 803(6).
52
See id.
53
Id.
54
Id. 803(8).
55
See id. 803(8)(B).
44
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it is a stretch to include MEs as law enforcement personnel. 56
The vital statistics exception could also support the admission of
an autopsy report, excepting “[r]ecords or data compilations, in
any form, of . . . deaths . . . if the report was made to a public
office pursuant to requirements of law.”57
Several cases have explored the admissibility of autopsy
reports within the framework of these hearsay exceptions. In
Sosna v. Binnington, the Eighth Circuit held that an autopsy
report qualified as a business record and that “the opinions of the
pathologist contained in his autopsy report fit comfortably within
Rule 803(6)’s confines.” 58 In United States v. Feliz, the Second
Circuit also found that autopsy reports prepared by the Office of
the Chief Medical Examiner fall under the business record
exception. 59 In United States v. Rosa, the Second Circuit held
that an autopsy report qualified as a public record under
803(8)(B), stating that, in contrast to the adversarial approach of
law enforcement agents, “a medical examiner’s reported
observations as to a body’s condition are normally made as part
of an independent effort to determine a cause of death.” 60 The
Second Circuit upheld the exclusion of the report’s conclusions
while admitting the observations, and holding that 803(8)(C) only

Even if they were, the Senate Judiciary Committee found that the recorded
observations of a law enforcement officer who was unavailable “should be admitted
as the best available evidence.” S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 17 (1974); see also State v.
Manocchio, 497 A.2d 1, 7 (R.I. 1985) (declining to include MEs within the category of
“police officers and other law-enforcement personnel”); cf. United States v. Hansen,
583 F.2d 325, 333 (7th Cir. 1978) (“We do not believe we are justified in broadening
the interpretation of the rules phrase ‘police officers and other law enforcement
personnel’ to include city building inspectors.”). But cf. Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009) (“A forensic analyst responding to a
request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to
alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.”).
57
FED. R. EVID. 803(9). It may only be intended to apply to the likes of death
certificates, but the cause of death and manner of death appear on a death
certificate as well. Since those are the less objective portions of an autopsy, it would
seem to undermine the purpose of the exception to allow only the conclusions and
not the supporting observations into evidence.
58
321 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2003).
59
See 467 F.3d 227, 236–37 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that autopsy reports fall
within the business record exception notably because the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner is an “independent office,” and the autopsies are performed and the
reports are prepared “without regard to the likelihood of their use at trial”). For an
additional opinion see United States v. Feliz, 201 F. App’x 814 (2d Cir. 2006).
60
11 F.3d 315, 332 (2d Cir. 1993).
56
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applies to evidence presented against the Government. 61 The
First Circuit, a decade later, held that a death certificate could
not be redacted under 803(8)(C) unless its trustworthiness was
called into question. 62 The First Circuit also analogized medical
records and autopsy reports, holding that, so long as it seems
reliable, an autopsy report, including its opinions and diagnoses,
ought to be admissible under 803(6). 63 Against this backdrop,
evidentiary exceptions seem to approach autopsy reports with
flexibility, permitting their admission as business records and as
public records.
Another route that can be explored to overcome the hearsay
rule is based on the idea that when the report was written, it
captured the testimony of the ME at that time. While the time
between the autopsy and time of report is likely too long to
satisfy the present sense impression exception, which is reserved
for descriptions or explanations made while observing the event
“or immediately thereafter,” 64 it is of great importance in terms of
the recorded recollection exception, which allows a witness to use
a recorded recollection to testify on a matter the witness once had
knowledge of, but has insufficient recollection of while
testifying. 65 Because MEs perform many autopsies, and the time
between an autopsy and an ensuing trial can be months, even
years, the recorded recollection exception can assist them in
entering their findings as noted in the autopsy report into
evidence. It also offers assistance to the supervising pathologist
when a forensic pathologist in training, working under direct
supervision, performs an autopsy that is pertinent to a criminal
trial. 66 Particularly, in such a case, the supervising pathologist’s
recollection may not be so strong, and the other pathologist will

61
Id. at 333. When the Second Circuit encountered this decision in ruling on
Feliz, it sidestepped the issue on the grounds that the defendants did not challenge
the report’s admission as a business record and that the report’s admission was
harmless error because the witness who testified provided his own conclusions based
on the observations in the report. See Feliz, 467 F.3d at 236 n.6.
62
See Blake v. Pellegrino, 329 F.3d 43, 48–49 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that a
subjective valuation of its substantive conclusions, such as the cause of death, was
insufficient to redact a death certificate).
63
See Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 780–81 (1st Cir. 1990).
64
FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
65
See id. 803(5).
66
See AM. BD. OF PATHOLOGY, supra note 4, at 7.
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likely have moved on after her fellowship, leaving the supervisor
to step in and offer testimony. In such a case, the recorded
recollection exception will serve the pathologist well.
Finally, the autopsy report may be entered under the catchall residual exception. To fall within the residual exception, the
statement
must
have
“circumstantial
guarantees
of
trustworthiness.” 67 The Rules require a showing that
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; . . . the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and . . . the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. 68

In Manocchio v. Moran, the First Circuit did not expressly
use Rule 807 in finding an autopsy report’s admission
constitutional, instead using the more concrete 803(6) and (8). 69
The court did seemingly use the analysis in seeking out
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause. 70 The court held that because the autopsy
report was “properly authenticated” and because there was no
showing that the ME had any “motivation . . . to falsify the
report,” any inclusion of double hearsay based on the police
report was harmless error “because the accuracy of the included
information was not in issue.” 71 The court also found that the
report’s ruling of “homicide” was “no more than a restatement of
the examiner’s medical conclusion that death resulted from the
multiple injuries observed on the decedent’s body.” 72 While this
is in no way a complete accounting of how Rule 807 and autopsy
reports interact, it provides a blueprint. Given the other
considerations in the hypothetical of the unavailable ME, 73 and
the demands of 807, the court lays out a path worth considering
for introducing an autopsy report through Rule 807.
Another portion of the Federal Rules of Evidence that is
important to the discussion of the introduction of autopsy reports
into evidence is contained in Article VII, which covers opinions
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

FED. R. EVID. 807.
Id.
919 F.2d 770, 775–76 (1st Cir. 1990).
Id. at 777.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.B.
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and expert testimony. 74
An expert witness is one
“qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education [to] testify . . . in the form of an opinion or otherwise,”
generally in the field of science or technology. 75 The Rules insist
on three criteria for expert testimony: that it be “based upon
sufficient facts or data,” that it be “the product of reliable
principles and methods,” and that the expert “appl[y] the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” 76 MEs
often qualify as expert witnesses and, in that capacity, can offer
their opinions on the facts presented. This is important for cases
where portions of a death certificate or autopsy report have been
redacted. An expert witness, even without prior knowledge of
the case, can provide her opinion of the observations included in
the autopsy report, either to provide the defendant with a second
opinion, or to provide the prosecution with expert testimony that
fills the evidentiary gap created by the redaction.
While this Note has thusfar been concerned with the
evidentiary issue of hearsay, these exceptions to the hearsay rule
were introduced to the discussion to examine the trial court
standard that has been applied to measure many Confrontation
Clause issues. While these Rules are subject to judicial and
congressional amendment, they were drafted by the Supreme
Court and have survived with limited amendment since 1975. 77
Presumably, the Court accounted for the Confrontation Clause in
drafting the Rules; 78 that also presumes, however, that courts
have interpreted them according to their intent. So while the
hearsay exceptions, as they have come to be understood, strongly
support the introduction of an autopsy report if its creator is
unavailable, that interpretation is “an adjunct to the
confrontation right in constitutional areas.” 79 The dispositive

See FED. R. EVID. 702–05.
Id. 702.
76
Id. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), for the
Supreme Court’s lead case on the qualification of experts and the treatment of their
testimony.
77
See Glenn Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1319–21 (1992).
78
Congress’s Advisory Committee extensively analyzed confrontation as it
relates to hearsay while considering the 1987 Amendment. See FED. R. EVID. art.
VIII advisory committee’s note.
79
Id.
74
75
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analysis in the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence explores whether or not the nature of the evidence
is “testimonial.” 80
C. Confrontation Under the Sixth Amendment
Under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be
confronted with the witnesses against him.” 81
This basic
protection is designed to allow for the cross-examination of one’s
accuser on the testimony and evidence he or she presents. 82
Cross-examination grants the opportunity to the accused to
expose inconsistent statements, witness bias, credibility issues,
and other similarly important characteristics of the testimony so
that the jury has all of the information it requires to weigh the
testimony presented. 83 In a system that presumes innocence, it
is paramount to allow the accused the maximum opportunity to
cast doubt on guilt. The right to confront and cross-examine has
existed since the earliest days of the Union, 84 and it was
explicitly incorporated in 1965 to apply to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas. 85 From that was
born a line of cases that developed and refined how courts and
parties looked at the Confrontation Clause, that considered the

80
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) and its
predecessors for an analysis of testimonial evidence as it relates to the Confrontation
Clause.
81
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
82
See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (“[A] fact which can be
primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved . . . except by witnesses
who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he is
entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in every mode
authorized by the established rules . . . .”).
83
See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (“The primary object
of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte
affidavits . . . in lieu of a . . . cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of
the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”).
84
See Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55 (“One of the fundamental guaranties of life and
liberty is found in the [S]ixth [A]mendment of the [C]onstitution of the United
States . . . .”).
85
380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965) (reversing a defendant’s conviction for a denial of
his Sixth Amendment rights on the grounds that testimony from a preliminary
hearing cannot be used if the declarant cannot be confronted in open court).
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role of policy in confrontation matters, and that wholly redefined
the type of evidence that required confrontation to survive
introduction into evidence.
1.

History Leading up to Melendez-Diaz

The Confrontation Clause’s relationship to state policy
interests was squarely addressed with the Court’s ruling in Davis
v. Alaska. 86 In Davis, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
overcomes even strong state policy considerations. 87 The key
prosecution witness in this case was a juvenile delinquent who
was on probation, but because Alaska had a law protecting
juvenile delinquents from the release of this information, the
defendant was not permitted to confront the witness and to
attempt to impeach his credibility on his probationary status. 88
The Court held that the defendant must be allowed to crossexamine his accuser despite the State’s interest in protecting the
anonymity of juvenile offenders, and found no reason to allow the
People to put forth any alternative to the actual accuser. 89 In
weighing the interests, the defendant’s opportunity to show bias
and cast suspicions on a key identifying witness of the
prosecution in an effort to avoid conviction far outweighed the
embarrassment the witness and his family might feel. 90 With
this decision, the Court made it clear that state policy interests
alone cannot overcome the constitutional guarantee to confront. 91
Confrontation Clause rights ebbed and flowed through the
end of the millennium, reaching their low-water mark under
Ohio v. Roberts. 92 In this case, the defendant, accused of, among
other things, forgery, called a witness at a preliminary hearing,
pressed her for information, and tried to elicit an admission from
her that she had misled the defendant; when the case went to
trial, she was subpoenaed but did not appear, and could not be
found even by her mother. 93 At trial, the defendant claimed that
415 U.S. 308 (1974).
See id. at 319 (“We do not and need not challenge the State’s interest as a
matter of its own policy in the administration of criminal justice to seek to preserve
the anonymity of a juvenile offender.”).
88
Id. at 309.
89
Id. at 320.
90
Id. at 319.
91
See id. at 320.
92
448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
93
Id. at 58–60.
86
87
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the witness had misled him, so the State introduced the
transcript from the preliminary hearing to counter that claim. 94
The defense objected, claiming a violation of the Confrontation
Clause. 95 The Court held that prosecutors must only make a
good faith effort to make witnesses available for crossexamination. 96 The Court found that the defense did effectively
take advantage of an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
during the preliminary hearing—even though it was a direct
examination in form and purpose, it comported to a crossexamination. 97 The Court also found that the witness displayed
the requisite “indicia of reliability” in her testimony. 98 The
Roberts Court built its reasoning off of the maxim that “[t]he law
does not require the doing of a futile act,” noting that a dead
witness—or a live one that had run away to another state and
could not be tracked down—cannot be expected to be crossexamined, and the prosecution’s efforts to locate any other
unavailable witness will be judged by the standard of
reasonableness. 99 In short, the Court presented the analysis
along bifurcated lines: If the defendant had the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, the witness’s testimony must be
reliable; and if the witness is unavailable, the prosecution must
have made a good faith effort to locate her. 100 In this context, the
Court makes it clear that hearsay evidence can satisfy the
Confrontation issues it faces. 101 This analysis prevailed for over
two decades, but with the new millennium came a revised
outlook. 102

Id. at 59.
Id.
96
Id. at 74.
97
Id. at 66, 70–71, 73.
98
Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972)).
99
Id. at 74.
100
See id. at 66, 74.
101
Id. at 65 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (“[T]he
[c]lause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that ‘there is
no material departure from the reason of the general rule.’ ”)); see also id. at 66
(quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (“[C]ertain hearsay
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence
within them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’ ”)).
102
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
94
95
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Under Crawford v. Washington, the Court overruled Roberts
and set out in a completely new direction. 103 In Crawford, the
Court unanimously decided that testimonial statements made
out of court were inadmissible, regardless of the reliability of the
statements, unless the witness was unavailable and the
defendant had an earlier opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. 104 In this case, the defendant was charged with assault
and attempted murder for stabbing a man who allegedly tried to
rape his wife. 105 The trial court admitted the tape of a police
interrogation of his wife, in which she undercut the husband’s
self-defense claim, under a hearsay exception and deemed it
reliable. 106 She did not testify at trial, claiming protection under
a state spousal immunity law. 107 The Court held that while this
satisfied a hearsay exception, it violated the Confrontation
Clause because it fell within “this core class of ‘testimonial’
statements.” 108 Testimonial statements are characterized as incourt testimony or the functional equivalent, made ex parte, not
permitting an opportunity for cross-examination, and are
reasonably expected by the declarant to be used at trial. 109 By
shifting the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence to the
testimonial or nontestimonial nature of the statements, the
Court delivered an absolute right, independent of hearsay
exceptions, to have the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant on testimonial statements.
The Court then went on to declare, also unanimously, in
Davis v. Washington, that when the author of “testimony” offered
it with the expectation that it would be used as evidence, it would
be considered testimonial and would trigger the defendant’s right
to confront the author. 110 Davis was a domestic violence case, in
103
See id. From the Court’s opinion, this is not immediately clear, because
Justice Scalia never bluntly overrules Roberts. But the dissent leads with such a
blunt statement, and, only weeks later, other courts began to proclaim the end of
Roberts. See, e.g., State v. Brown 156 S.W.3d 722, 731 (Ark. 2004). It should be noted
that other courts stated that the Roberts approach had instead been abrogated. See,
e.g., United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 898 (S.D. Ind. 2004). This fine
distinction, however, has no bearing on the issues presented in this Note.
104
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
105
Id. at 38.
106
Id. at 40.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 51.
109
Id. Please note that this is a characterization and not a definition.
110
547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
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which the defendant was charged with violating a domestic nocontact order. 111 The State introduced a 911 transcript of the
Its
victim’s call, because the victim would not testify. 112
companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, involved a domestic
battery in which the State introduced the victim’s affidavit and
the officer who was on the scene gave hearsay evidence of what
the victim said; again, the victim did not testify. 113 The Court
held that “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when . . . the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet
an ongoing emergency.
They are testimonial when . . . the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” 114 The
911 transcripts were admitted without the victim’s testimony or
availability for cross-examination because they were prepared to
respond to the emergency; but the affidavit and the victim’s
statements were ruled “inherently testimonial” as they served as
a “substitute for live testimony.” 115 Within this framework, the
distinguishing feature is whether or not the statement is being
offered for trial or for the matter at hand. Justice Thomas,
however, has been very critical of the “testimonial” approach in
his opinions, labeling it as “unpredictable.” 116
Prior to Crawford and Davis, prosecutors only had to show
good faith in trying to secure the witness for crossexamination. 117 Good faith, in effect, created a safe harbor for
using hearsay evidence. Crawford and Davis, though, combined
to gut this safe harbor for prosecutors and law enforcement
agents. The Court, in a short time, had changed the analysis
from questions of availability, reliability, and good faith, to
questions of the testimonial nature of the evidence and the
presence or absence of an earlier opportunity to cross-examine.
The abrogation of Roberts signified a new and significant check
on prosecutors, setting aside questions of hearsay and placing it
Id. at 818.
Id. at 817–19.
113
Id. at 819–20.
114
Id. at 822.
115
Id. at 829–30.
116
Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas does not even consider it
a Confrontation Clause issue, only finding it triggered when there is “solemnity” to
the proceeding. Id. at 837–38.
117
See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980), overruled by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
111
112
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squarely in the constitutional realm. 118 The preeminence of the
Sixth Amendment seemed to have reached its apex, but this was
only a new height, soon to be surpassed for the introduction of
forensic reports.
2.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts

Melendez-Diaz imposed an even more rigorous interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause on prosecutors to introduce scientific
findings on evidence. A coconspirator of the defendant had been
engaged in suspicious activities to which a coworker had tipped
off the police. 119 The police investigation led to the arrest of three
men and to the seizure of several plastic bags containing a
substance that appeared to be cocaine. 120 On the drive to the
police station, the officers noticed the men “fidgeting and making
furtive movements,” so they searched the cruiser after dropping
the men at the station and found more plastic bags containing a
substance that also appeared to be cocaine. 121 All of the seized
evidence was sent to a state lab for analysis. 122 At trial, the bags
were placed into evidence, along with three “ ‘certificates of
analysis’ ” that reported the weight of the bags and identified
their contents as cocaine. 123 In accordance with Massachusetts
law, the certificates had been sworn to by state lab analysts
before a notary public. 124
Defendant’s counsel objected on the grounds that his client
was denied the right to confront the analysts who had prepared
the certificates of analysis, and while the objection was overruled
at trial, a sharply divided Supreme Court came down on the side
of
Melendez-Diaz
and
a
broader
interpretation
of
confrontation. 125 When the Court issued its decision, many
prosecutors were concerned with how this would impact their

118
See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“Where testimonial statements are
involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of
‘reliability.’ ”).
119
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 2530–31 (quoting Petition For Writ of Certiorari at Appendix 24a, 26a,
28a, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591), 2007 WL 3252033).
124
Id. at 2531.
125
Id. at 2531–32.
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ability to use forensic evidence at trial. 126 The Court held that
“[t]he Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove
its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits, and the admission of
such evidence against Melendez-Diaz was error.” 127 In other
words, a defendant must be afforded the constitutional
opportunity to cross-examine the particular state-employed
analyst responsible for a laboratory report for the report to be
introduced into evidence at trial. Within this “straightforward
application of . . . Crawford,” 128 however, there is a large degree
of ambiguity explored in Part II below. The Court’s division also
limits the reach of the decision.
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in particular, as the fifth vote
in Melendez-Diaz and as a past critic of the Court’s approach in
Davis, 129 limits the Court’s ruling. While he joined the majority,
his concurrence clarified that his stance in this case was
motivated by the nature and format of the forensic report. 130 He
reiterated his stance from White v. Illinois 131 and from Davis that
“ ‘the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial
statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions.’ ” 132 Since the forensic report was in
the form of an affidavit, Justice Thomas came to the same
conclusion as the majority; 133 as the deciding vote in a 5-4
decision, however, he limited the scope of the decision to the
narrowest grounds of his concurrence. 134 This raises a significant
question of whether the Court divided along the lines of form or
substance. Justice Scalia’s opinion in Davis focused on the
126
See Adam Liptak, Justices Rule Crime Analysts Must Testify on Lab Results,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at A1.
127
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542 (reiterating that Melendez-Diaz is only an
application of Crawford).
128
Id. at 2533.
129
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting majority, 547 U.S. at 822) (“Today, a mere
two years after the Court decided Crawford, it adopts an equally unpredictable test,
under which district courts are charged with divining the ‘primary purpose’ of police
interrogations.”).
130
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
131
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
132
Id. (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 836
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
134
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
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primary purpose of the interrogation, suggesting that substance
is most important to him, 135 while Justice Thomas, in MelendezDiaz, continued to require formalized testimonial materials. 136 It
remains an open question as to whether the information,
delivered in another format—for example, a computer print out
of the lab results—without “formalized testimonial material” of
the analyst that ran the test, would steer clear of Justice
Thomas’s proscription. Likewise, his stance on autopsy reports—
which are prepared for many deaths, not only for criminal
matters—remains undefined. As a result, prosecutors, MEs, and
courts are left to wonder how they must manage autopsy reports
in criminal matters.
II. UNDERSTANDING HOW MELENDEZ-DIAZ APPLIES TO AUTOPSY
REPORTS
The majority opinion of Melendez-Diaz only mentions
autopsies once, in the Court’s fifth footnote. 137 The dissent uses
the admission of autopsy reports in half a dozen cases as
evidence of a historical trend against considering forensic
analysis testimonial. 138 In each of these instances in which
autopsy reports are mentioned, they are lumped in with other
forensic analyses and never addressed as a unique matter. At no
point does the Court consider the distinctions between general
lab reports and autopsy reports. Autopsy reports, however, are a
different type of forensic report, prepared regardless of criminal
activity139 and often in its absence at a hospital or at the request
of a family. Autopsy reports are not prepared in anticipation of
trial, and their use at trial, just like the use of medical records at
trial, is incidental. 140 Autopsy reports also involve different
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
137
The text and footnote read, respectively: “Respondent and the dissent may be
right that there are other ways—and in some cases better ways—to challenge or
verify the results of a forensic test,” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536; “Though
surely not always. Some forensic analyses, such as autopsies and breathalyzer tests,
cannot be repeated, and the specimens used for other analyses have often been lost
or degraded.” Id. n.5.
138
See id. at 2554–60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
139
So long as other criteria are met. See PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 3–
4.
140
See United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Office of
the Chief Medical Examiner of New York conducts thousands of routine autopsies
every year, without regard to the likelihood of their use at trial.”).
135
136

CP_Tsiatis (Do Not Delete)

378

7/14/2011 4:22 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:355

policy implications, as their primary functions are to serve public
health officials in prioritizing health risks and to stand as the
final medical record for the individual. 141 The status of autopsy
reports unaccompanied by the testimony of the MEs that
prepared them is uncertain in criminal cases under MelendezDiaz, and courts have recently grappled with this and come down
on opposite sides. 142 The argument that autopsy reports are
different and should not be considered as formalized testimonial
material carries some weight. As that argument has been
foreclosed in some jurisdictions, 143 barring a Supreme Court
reversal, it requires a more creative solution. So with minor
adjustments, either by the MEs or by the courts, to separate
observations from rationales and conclusions, the majority of any
autopsy report should be admissible without the testimony of the
pathologist who performed the autopsy. 144 Ideally, the ME would
be present; but if the ME were unavailable—through change of
job, relocation, sickness, or death—large portions of the report
should still survive admission. 145 Particularly because of the
uncertainty of the opinion’s breadth, and the difficulties that
courts have had in applying Melendez-Diaz, the question remains
open.
A.

Interpreting Melendez-Diaz

Along with the restrictions placed on the opinion by Justice
Thomas’s concurrence, 146 the Court wrestled with the breadth of
its opinion, the determination of the actual analyst, the
testimonial—or nontestimonial—nature of the evidence, and the

See MED. EXAM’RS’ & CORONERS’ HANDBOOK, supra note 14.
See, e.g., Wood v. State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 215–16 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding
that an expert witness testifying on an autopsy report he did not prepare violated
the Confrontation Clause); Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass.
2009) (holding that while the autopsy report itself was not admissible, a substitute
ME could testify as an expert and provide his opinions based on a review of the
autopsy report).
143
See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009) (using
Melendez-Diaz to define an autopsy report as testimonial).
144
Cf. Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 778–84 (1st Cir. 1990) (describing the
four different categories of information in an autopsy report as they relate to
admissibility).
145
Cf. People v. Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d 38, 42, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846, 862 N.Y.S.2d
450, 453 (2008) (holding that an autopsy report with opinions redacted was
admissible even though the ME who performed it was not available to testify).
146
See supra Part I.C.2.
141
142
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consequences of its decision. There are several ways to interpret
Melendez-Diaz: as an application of Crawford, 147 as an extension
of Crawford, 148 or merely as a fact pattern that survived a
Crawford and Davis analysis. 149 While the third approach
accounts for Justice Thomas’s tenuous vote and likely is the most
accurate reflection of the Court, the battle in state courts has
been between the first two interpretations. 150 Should the third
interpretation accurately reflect the Court’s sentiment, it should
be expected that the Court will grant certiorari when the
appropriate case arises to clarify its stance and correct the
rulings below. 151 The other two interpretations create different
results.
The Court claimed that its ruling was merely an application
of Crawford. 152 It certainly satisfies the Crawford analysis as the
certificates stated “ ‘[t]he substance was found to contain:
Cocaine,’ ” 153 and were prepared and notarized for the purpose of
serving as evidence. 154 Crawford seems satisfied because these
certificates were the functional equivalent of in-court testimony
reasonably expected by the declarant to be used at trial, and the
declarant was not available for cross-examination.
The dissent, however, found it to be a broad-sweeping
extension of Crawford, touching on many evidentiary issues,
impacting numerous fields of science and forensics beyond drug
identification, and creating more confusion than clarity. 155 If the
147
The majority opinion stated this in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.
Ct. 2527, 2533 (2009) (stating that its decision was a “rather straightforward
application of our holding in Crawford”).
148
The dissenting opinion viewed it this way. Id. at 2552 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“The Court assumes, with little analysis, that Crawford and Davis
extended the Clause to any person who makes a ‘testimonial’ statement.”).
149
The concurring opinion suggested as much. See id. at 2543 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
150
See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009) (using
Melendez-Diaz to define an autopsy report as testimonial); Commmonwealth v.
Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 2009) (using Crawford to permit a substitute
ME to testify as an expert and provide his opinions based on a review of the autopsy
report, even though the autopsy report itself was not admissible).
151
The Court may have been looking for something like that in Briscoe v.
Virginia, but the facts must have ultimately proven uninspiring. See 130 S. Ct. 1316,
1316 (2010).
152
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542.
153
Id. at 2537 (quoting Petition For Writ of Certiorari at Appendix 24a, 26a,
28a, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591), 2007 WL 3252033).
154
See id. at 2531.
155
See id. at 2543–58 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Court’s most expansive approach were to apply, every analysis,
every scientific fact, even the laws of physics would seem to be up
for cross-examination.
Similarly, there is a great deal of confusion over who is the
actual analyst, especially as many of these analyses are
performed by teams. 156 The Court only noted that “it is not the
case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in
establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or
accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of
the prosecution’s case,” 157 but the dissent astutely pointed out the
following simple question: If not everyone, then who must be
made available for cross-examination? 158
Also, while the majority built its rationale on the Crawford
definition of “testimonial,” the dissent found that to be of little
assistance in limiting the impact of Melendez-Diaz. 159 The
dissent accused the majority of introducing an approach that is
“ ‘disconnected from history and unnecessary to prevent abuse’ ”
by including experts and atypical witnesses within the matrix of
witnesses that can provide testimonial materials. 160 Justice
Thomas was also wary, and specified that his definition of
“testimonial” is narrower and more formal than the definition
employed by the majority. 161
Finally, as the Court so often does when it is sharply divided,
the majority and dissent argued over the impact of the
decision. 162 If the courts continue to interpret Melendez-Diaz as
they had interpreted Crawford, then adjustments to statements
for form would seem to satisfy most confrontation issues. If,
however, there is more to this decision, as the dissent
vehemently stressed, the results will be grave for the justice
See id. at 2544.
See id. at 2532 n.1 (majority opinion).
158
See id. at 2544–46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
159
See id. at 2544.
160
Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
161
Compare id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 365 (1992)), with id. at 2531–32 (majority opinion) (quoting Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)). The expansive, example-filled definition
from Crawford contrasts with the limited and concise definition from White.
162
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Contrary to my usual practice, however, I think it appropriate to begin
with a description of the disastrous consequences of what the Court has done
today.”).
156
157
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system, going against decades of statutory and judicial law, 163
unnecessarily increasing the burden on prosecutors, and
undermining forensic analysis and the role of science in the
courthouse. 164 For the purposes of this Note, and whether courts
interpret Melendez-Diaz as an application of Crawford or as a
broad extension of Crawford, it is important to recognize that
autopsy reports are now precariously positioned, and must be
extracted from the general lump of forensic reports—as the
dissent did in its appendices. 165
The soundest course is to take the Court at its word and
continue to apply Crawford with regard to autopsy reports.
Crawford is still good law—decided recently by a unanimous
Court—and offers a rule with which both Justice Thomas and the
majority agree. 166 Pressing beyond the limits of Crawford invites
great uncertainty, and the courts that have done so have found
other grounds on which to avoid the outcomes that the dissent
has described. 167 In this legal atmosphere, the distinctions
between lab reports and autopsy reports, and the unique
interests at play with autopsy reports, make autopsy reports
worthy of special consideration under Melendez-Diaz as an
application of Crawford.

The long history and the many states that had rules, cases, and policies
affording lab reports unique admissibility included three state supreme courts,
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2554 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the decisions of
the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia; as opposed to
Montana, which distinguished its constitution from the U.S. Constitution, and
Oregon, which suggested notice might suffice), all circuit courts that considered it
before Crawford, id. (noting cases in the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits), twenty-four state courts that followed suit, id. at 2554, 2558–60
(pointing out decisions in California, Indiana, and Louisiana specifically excusing
the results of autopsies from confrontation), and eleven states that upheld burdenshifting statutes, id. at 2554. Sixteen state courts also upheld evidentiary rules
permitting scientific test results without in-court testimony, id. at 2554, 2560
(noting cases in California, New Jersey and New York, in particular), and the
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits came to similar results for federal hearsay
rules,, id. at 2554–55 (as distinguished from a Second Circuit case that law
enforcement reports cannot be similarly admitted).
164
See id. at 2547 (“There is nothing predictable here, however, other than the
uncertainty and disruption that now must ensue.”).
165
See id. at 2559–60.
166
See id. at 2532 (majority opinion); id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
167
See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009) (finding a
violation of the Confrontation Clause in the introduction of an autopsy report where
the forensic pathologist did not testify, but ruling the error harmless).
163
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B. Applying Melendez-Diaz to Autopsy Reports
While the Court in Melendez-Diaz was largely silent on
autopsy reports, the fifth footnote made an offhand reference 168
that has already been used as authority for ruling against
admission of an autopsy report. 169 While the dissent carefully
carved out some extra space for autopsy reports and noted that
they are among the wide range of scientific activities that may be
impacted by the decision, 170 the majority made its stance less
clear. The issue under Crawford hinges on whether or not it is
testimonial, and thus unexcused. 171 For this Court, that rested
the decision squarely on Justice Thomas. For the sake of
analysis, let us consider the facts of the following hypothetical. A
suspect is brought to trial on murder charges, and the evidence
against him includes an autopsy report prepared by an ME who
died two weeks after performing this autopsy alone. The ME left
photographs of the body and the wounds, an audio recording
narrating what she observed, a simultaneous video recording
capturing her actions and the same narration, and the blood and
toxicology reports that she had used in preparing her report
before she passed.
In analyzing this hypothetical, there are several important
factors to consider: what portions of this autopsy report can
survive a hearsay objection; who could testify as to their validity;
how do these forms of evidence differ from other laboratory
analyses; and what potential pieces of evidence, if any, are
testimonial.
The hearsay issue is an important threshold
question, because the constitutional issue will not arise if the
evidence is excluded on the basis of hearsay. 172 As discussed
above, the autopsy report and its various addenda—not including
the audio and video recordings, unless they were standard
procedure—would likely survive admission under the business

See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 n.5.
Locklear, 681 S.E.2d at 305 (“The Court specifically referenced autopsy
examinations as one such kind of forensic analyses.”).
170
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171
See id. at 2530–31 (majority opinion).
172
This is a matter of pure logic—if evidence is excluded on evidentiary grounds,
the court will not reach a potential constitutional issue. A violation of the
Confrontation Clause cannot be claimed on evidence that was not admitted.
168
169
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record exception or another 803 exception. 173 The audio and
video recordings could potentially be admitted as evidence of the
ME’s present sense impression. 174
Regardless of whether the report was admitted as a whole,
an expert who had reviewed the files would likely be called to
testify, and after years had passed, her independent review
would likely be just as sound as the review of the ME who had
initially performed it. These factors already highlight one
distinction of autopsy reports—because autopsies are only
performed once, 175 any independent review is based on the
information that the ME gathers during that initial
investigation. The ME is, therefore, charged with gathering
enough supporting data to allow for independent review. 176
Autopsies are also much more complex than the identification of
a narcotic, and are more prone to shades of gray, as their
outcome is a diagnosis, not a chemical compound match.
Similarly, while other forensic analyses may yield drug charges,
rape charges, and a host of other unsavory activity, autopsy
reports usually arise in situations where someone has died, so
only permitting an autopsy report to survive as evidence for as
long as its creator survives, would essentially create a statute of
limitations for murder. 177
The issue of which potential pieces of evidence prepared by
our hypothetical ME are testimonial, if any, remains. Under a
Crawford analysis, these all provide the functional equivalent of
in-court testimony, but even though the ME likely realized the
documents would be used in a trial, they were not prepared for
the primary purpose of serving as criminal evidence—instead
they were prepared as a record of the state of the body, mandated
by law for the purposes of public health and safety. Introduction
of the report through an expert, even if it is another ME, allows

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.
175
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 n.5.
176
See PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 5–6, (requiring the gathering of
enough supporting data for indpendent review in matters involving identification);
see also id. at 10–11, 13–14 (setting the bare minimum standard for cases involving
firearm injuries, sharp-force injuries, patterned injuries, and penetrating injuries,
including gunshot and sharp-force injuries, and blunt-impact injuries).
177
See Carolyn Zabrycki, Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy
Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1093, 1115 (2008).
173
174
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for cross-examination on the facts in the report and the
conclusions the expert has drawn. This reinforces a point that
will be returned to below: In this hypothetical, the prosecution
does not need the conclusions of the report—including those that
would potentially upset the Confrontation balance—because the
author of those conclusions could not be cross-examined. At the
same time, if those observations and facts can survive, an expert
can provide the conclusions and can be cross-examined on them,
satisfying one of the core goals of the Sixth Amendment. It is
important to note here that prior to Melendez-Diaz, including
under Crawford, no court had found an autopsy report to be
testimonial. 178 While an autopsy report would not seem to fall
within the core class of testimonial statements, it is very unlikely
that Justice Thomas would find an autopsy report to fall within
the limited criteria he lays out for “formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions.” 179 Autopsy reports are not gathered with the same
formalities common to those other documents and are not
specifically designed for the courtroom, so while the decision
should not be so close, the Supreme Court, in its current
composition, 180 would likely declare an autopsy report to be
nontestimonial.
While policy is not dispositive, 181 the interests involved make
a strong case for protecting autopsy reports in their current
format. The human needs that autopsies serve, the significant
role they play in people’s lives, and the incentives at play for an
ME are all persuasive when considering the importance of
leaving the format of autopsy reports relatively undisturbed, as
compared with other forms of forensic analysis. The dissent in
Melendez-Diaz suggested that, even for the certificates of
analysis, this was a more appropriate topic for the legislature in
If the introduction of
promulgating rules of evidence. 182

See id. at 1094.
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
180
The departure of Justice David Souter and the arrival of Justice Sonya
Sotomayor did not impact the Court’s thinking on Melendez-Diaz. See Briscoe v.
Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010).
181
See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974).
182
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2555 (2009) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
178
179
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certificates of analysis were protected as a policy matter, the
introduction of autopsy reports, with their unique policy
implications, should be protected many times over.
Autopsies touch on our humanity in a way that many other
scientific analyses do not approach. Autopsies are required for
many, many deaths, and reports are not prepared only for
suspected victims of criminal activity. 183 Often they happen at
the ME’s office, but they can also occur in private hospitals or in
private practices. 184 Those autopsies happening through the
ME’s office are public services and produce public records. 185 The
conclusions of the physicians are open to interpretation by and
challenge from the entire medical community—their professional
reputations are forever on the line.
At the same time, autopsies are performed on human bodies
just before they are prepared for their funerals and whatever
religious rights they may be afforded. Accordingly, the dead
person’s humanity and dignity ought to be respected. This is not
simply another piece of evidence or the contents of a plastic bag,
but something closer to a final medical report. In considering
what the Court should require in the unfortunate hypothetical in
which our ME dies just after performing the autopsy and writing
up the report, the Court must be sensitive, substantively, to our
societal needs for a thorough review, for appropriate access to the
report, and for a sense of closure for the family and for the State
provided there were no improprieties in the autopsy or its
reporting.
It is also important to consider that MEs’ only incentives are
to provide objective and accurate reports. 186 Their jobs are to
provide closure to people and to identify foul play when it is at
work. 187 Court appearances are incidental to the performance of
their job. 188 In Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia questioned the
183
See United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing how
the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in New York performs thousands of routine
autopsies annually without considering if or how they might be used at trial).
184
See Ron Shinkman, Autopsies R Us, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 5, 2001, at 58.
185
Cf. SeaWorld Trainer’s Family Wants To Prevent Release of Video Footage of
Accident, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/03/09/
seaworld-trainers-family-wants-prevent-release-video-footage-accident/.
186
See PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 1.
187
Id. at 1–2.
188
What Does a Forensic Pathologist Do?, NAT’L ASS’N OF MED. EXAM’RS (Nov. 8,
2006), http://thename.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid
=42.
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motives of the forensic analysts as state employees, 189 and,
perhaps, he is right to do so because forensic analysts have very
limited job opportunities beyond state-run laboratories. 190 That
said, by adjusting results to conform with the prosecution’s case,
they risk the certification of the lab and their careers. 191 On the
other side, pathologists acting in a similar way would risk their
licenses and their careers. 192 Those careers cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars and a decade, at least, to create. 193 They
always have the alternative to work in private practice or in a
hospital, so taking this job is hardly a “default” decision for them.
Moreover, judges and MEs share several features, in being
highly-trained state-employed professionals, at the pinnacle of
their careers, greatly respected for their independent analysis
and professional ability to be objective. If Justice Scalia’s opinion
is meant to reach as far as MEs, he indicts nearly every public
servant, himself included. Although the Court has moved away
from issues of trustworthiness, leaving those for hearsay
analysis, if we, as a society, were to allocate trust, much would be
placed with our physicians, making the policy decision of
protecting this work product that much more important.
III. TAKING THE “TESTIMONIAL” OUT OF AUTOPSY REPORTS
Autopsy reports are unlike the impersonal analysis of a bag
of narcotics. A person, whose story—whether tragic, heroic, or
unremarkable—awaits a conclusion, lays bare on a cold table to
have the question mark at the end of her life changed to a period.
Most people will lay on that table one day, and pathologists will
make routine examinations, much like the other check-ups
experienced over the course of their lives. This will allow
families, friends, and loved ones to continue to live with the
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536–37 (2009).
MEs’ other opportunities lay largely in academics and in the military. See
Randy Skelton, So You Want To Be a Forensic Anthropologist?, http://www.
nakedscience.org/foranth.htm (last revised May 24, 1996).
191
See Sanctions, AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIR., LAB. ACCREDITATION BD.,
http://www.ascld-lab.org/monitoring/sanctions.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
192
For an example of the consequences of incompetence, let alone malicious
tampering, see Carol Marbin Miller & Marc Caputo, Autopsy Uproar Not M.E.’s
First, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 21, 2006.
193
Tuition at Johns Hopkins Medical School was $39,500 for the 2009–2010
academic year. Student Billing Information, JOHNS HOPKINS MED.,
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/som/offices/finaffairs/billing (last visited Apr. 5,
2011).
189
190
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answers they have received and the closure they have been
granted. Autopsies are an important part of our social fabric and
any adjustment to them must be weighed carefully.
Some legal thinkers consider them testimonial, 194 and it is
more difficult, after the Court found in Melendez-Diaz that an
affidavit stating that cocaine was cocaine was testimonial, to
think a court would not find an autopsy report to be testimonial
and to implicate the Confrontation Clause. Although Justice
Thomas and the Court may obviate the need for this if the right
case arises, there is a solution in finding an exception to meet the
needs of our society and the standards of our Bill of Rights. In
approaching the issue, it is important to understand why action
must be taken.
To begin, the long history of scientific evidence’s
admissibility presented by the dissent of Melendez-Diaz applies
with equal force as to why autopsies deserve special exception.
Within the history of lab reports presented, there is a dividing
line between general lab reports and autopsy reports. The
dissent subdivided the cases referenced in its appendices to treat
autopsy and medical records cases as a separate subdivision. 195
Similarly, there is post-Crawford precedent for courts to find
autopsy reports to be nontestimonial or, if testimonial, not
prohibited from introduction because they are subject to a
hearsay exception. 196 In fact, every court that has decided this
issue since Crawford has held that they are not testimonial, 197
until recently, when the Supreme Court of North Carolina
pronounced its holding in State v. Locklear. 198 By applying
Melendez-Diaz to find an autopsy report testimonial, the high
court of North Carolina sounded a warning bell.
The court in Locklear passed over many of the nuances of the
issue and treated the autopsy report as “testimonial,” because it
considered an autopsy report to be a forensic analysis and
because the Court had referenced autopsy reports in the fifth
footnote of Melendez-Diaz. 199 The court ultimately found the

See, e.g., Zabrycki, supra note 177, at 1094.
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2558–61 (2009).
196
See, e.g., United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2008); United
States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006).
197
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
198
681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009).
199
See State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009).
194
195

CP_Tsiatis (Do Not Delete)

388

7/14/2011 4:22 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:355

error harmless, 200 but the brief and abridged analysis shows how
wide open the issue is. 201 A full Crawford analysis, rather than
an abridged Melendez-Diaz analysis that ignores Justice
Thomas’s concurrence, shows the flaws in this logic.
In
Crawford,
the
Court
specifically
refused
to
define
“testimonial,” 202 but it had fleshed it out earlier in the decision to
illustrate where it clearly existed. 203 Testimonial is not a clear
term that can be applied without qualification to all forensic
analyses, especially in light of Justice Thomas’s concurrence in
Melendez-Diaz. 204 Locklear’s pro forma analysis skipped the vital
step of determining whether the report was or was not
testimonial, finding that an autopsy report, which was referenced
only in a footnote, was immediately comparable to the certificate
of analysis in Melendez-Diaz. 205 By not discussing its testimonial
or nontestimonial nature, the court missed an opportunity to
focus on the real issue.
But other courts that have approached the issue more
thoroughly have reached different conclusions. The Michigan
Court of Appeals found autopsy reports, exclusive of their
opinions and conclusions, can be used at trial without
opportunity to cross-examine the ME, and that another expert
witness can testify based on the observations embodied in the
report. 206 The court also found that autopsy reports survived as
business records, which are expressly excused under Crawford. 207
The reasoning behind this is that the factual descriptions
contained in an autopsy report provide for an accurate
independent review—much as photos do—and do not constitute
They
the type of testimony that is given in court. 208
See id. at 304.
Id.
202
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“We leave for another day
any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’ ”).
203
See id. at 51–52.
204
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
205
See Locklear, 681 S.E.2d at 304–05.
206
People v. King, No. 282533, 2010 WL 98693, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 12,
2010) (per curiam).
207
See id. at *5; see also People v. Cortez, 931 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010) (“Defendant suggests that the autopsy report admitted in this case is similar
to the certificates admitted in Melendez-Diaz. However, defendant overlooks the fact
that this court has previously held that autopsy reports are business records and do
not implicate Crawford.”).
208
King, 2010 WL 98693, at *4–*5.
200
201
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distinguished the case from Melendez-Diaz by pointing out that
these were not “purely ‘bare-bones’ conclusory statements” and
that autopsy reports were not actually singled out as violative of
As a result, the court was
the Confrontation Clause. 209
comfortable in affirming the lower court and finding no violation
of the Confrontation Clause. 210
Other appellate courts have danced around the issue by
looking at the standard for reversal and finding that, even if it
were testimonial, it was not prejudicial. 211 In short, this issue is
still open and there is still a strong argument that unless the
Court expressly includes autopsy reports among testimonial
documents, autopsy reports are admissible without the testimony
of their authors.
Given the guidance the Judiciary has
prescribed recently, it may be more effective to take proactive
steps to trim and organize autopsy reports to meet their
important objectives, while also paying mind to judicial trends,
thus leaning them away from the testimonial label. 212
IV. TOWARDS A “LEAN RULE” TO PROTECT CONFRONTATION
RIGHTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF AUTOPSY REPORTS
While autopsy reports are prepared in the ordinary course of
business, and are a matter of public record, they only fulfill their
valuable public service if they contain the inferences and
conclusions that the MEs draw. If the Court were to make them
inadmissible in court when they are so trusted and so common,
this would not comport with the value generally assigned to
them. So the question remains, how can the results of an
autopsy survive their author, if they cannot be preserved under
the business records exception—a result which is in question
after Melendez-Diaz. 213

Id. at *3 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543
(2009)).
210
Id. at *11.
211
See, e.g., Mungo v. United States, 987 A.2d 1145 (D.C. 2010); State v.
Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009).
212
Cf. People v. Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d 38, 42, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846, 862 N.Y.S.2d
450, 453 (2008) (autopsy report with opinions redacted was held not to be
testimonial). While Freycinet was decided before Melendez-Diaz, its Crawford
analysis would seem to conform with the Court’s approach in Melendez-Diaz.
213
See Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 709–10 (Ind. 2009) (Rucker, J.,
dissenting). Contra King, 2010 WL 98693, at *5.
209

CP_Tsiatis (Do Not Delete)

390

7/14/2011 4:22 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:355

Melendez-Diaz challenges are being brought in many cases
that involve lab reports, charging that the reports are testimonial
and violate the defendant’s confrontation rights. 214 They will
continue to arise as a standard matter when forensic data is
involved and the analyst or ME is not present for testimony.
While the courts resolve the uncertainty surrounding how exactly
to apply Melendez-Diaz, the information contained in these
reports is simply too important to wait for the next landmark
decision. As a result, there are two main question to address:
(1) should MEs adjust the format by which they report a
thorough human autopsy—which is generally the last word on
how someone found his or her end, and (2) should courts adjust
the approach used when accepting autopsy reports into evidence?
One or the other must be answered affirmatively, but ideally
both would.
By adjusting their practices, MEs and courts can hopefully
help autopsy reports survive Melendez-Diaz—should it be
interpreted to impact evidence to the level that the dissent
fears—while also protecting the important civil liberties
promised by the Sixth Amendment. MEs must stay true to their
duty to diagnose, and cannot shift formats to a checklist or to a
simple list of detailed information. They also must retain some
flexibility in the style in which pathologists can produce reports,
so they can address all matters completely and adequately and so
that the reports can be useful for public records, for the families
and loved ones, and as evidence admissible in court. 215 While
autopsy reports are not particularly uniform, partly because each
case has the potential to be very unique, they do generally
include certain measurements and findings. 216 They all also
contain opinions and conclusory statements, for example the
cause of death. 217 These parts of the report are what families
look to for a sense of closure and finality; they are also the pieces

See, e.g., Pendergrass, 913 N.E.2d at 708.
Demanding a restricted format would be akin to handing a judge a law
student’s brief template and asking her to write all future opinions in that format.
There is a point at which simplification becomes counterproductive, despite
perceived efficiency.
216
See supra Part I.A.
217
See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text.
214
215

CP_Tsiatis (Do Not Delete)

2011]

PUTTING MELENDEZ-DIAZ ON ICE

7/14/2011 4:22 PM

391

that go on the death certificate. 218 At the same time, mistakes in
those conclusions are riskier as evidence because they can be
mistaken for fact.
To resolve this issue, a “lean rule” should be adopted by both
MEs and the courts. MEs should adopt a lean format of autopsy
reporting that they use in all cases; 219 likewise, courts should
look to accept autopsy reports into evidence in a lean format. 220
This idea of “leanness” would be designed to comply with the
Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, segregating
information based on its questionably testimonial or clearly
nontestimonial characteristics. The lean portion would contain
clearly nontestimonial matter, for example a description of the
procedures used, sizes, weights, measurements, observations of
items of interest with matching photographs, etc. The more
testimonial identification of the deceased—cause of death,
manner of death, and other similar statements based on opinion
and conclusion—would be separated out. An autopsy report
designed for lean reporting would have, for example, on the left
hand side of the page, the objective observations and
measurements; on the right hand side, the opinions and
conclusions alongside the objective details that triggered those
diagnoses. Another example of how to set up a lean report would
be to have a separate form that covers all nontestimonial matter
and is attached as an addendum to the full report. 221
In both of these formats, the complete report is still prepared
and still available, 222 but in the unfortunate event that the ME is
unavailable, the prosecution can easily offer the lean autopsy
report, stripped of its opinions and conclusions, to be analyzed by
an expert who can be cross-examined at trial. This also provides
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
While there are standards for defining potentially criminal activity, see
PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 3–4, adjusting reporting in anticipation that
the document would be used at trial would throw this immediately within the
testimonial category of the entire line of cases culminating in Melendez-Diaz. See,
e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (quoting
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).
220
For an example of how this was accomplished successfully, and a rationale
supporting it, see People v. Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d 38, 892 N.E.2d 843, 862 N.Y.S.2d
450 (2008).
221
These are a couple of examples that illustrate how content could be arranged.
The mechanics of implementing such a new style of report and its precise format
ought to be left to the operational experts in the field.
222
And still useful as a public record!
218
219
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a court with a format that it can easily redact should it run into a
properly-posed Confrontation Clause challenge. Some care would
have to be taken for the report not to slip into a format like the
core class of testimonial statements, because if it took on an
affidavit structure or that of a notarized certificate of analysis, it
would almost certainly run afoul of the Confrontation Clause.
This lean format creates much greater flexibility for the use
of autopsy reports in the current legal landscape, while still
protecting their many important non-legal uses. It also allows
MEs to retain all of their substantive responsibilities, without
sacrificing the potential to use the report should the case be part
of a trial and the ME is unavailable. Organizing the report in
such a way that allows the two sections to be easily separated is
a minor inconvenience, but can greatly speed the redaction
process to move the lean portion of the report, that is, the
nontestimonial observations and measurements, into evidence to
be analyzed and opined on by an expert.
Courts can similarly apply the “lean rule” to redact autopsy
reports that do not conform to the proposed structure. By
trimming the questionably testimonial segments from an autopsy
report, the court can allow the defendant to confront the facts
that accuse him by calling his own expert to testify as to false or
objectionable conclusions or flawed process, or by crossexamining an expert the prosecution calls to discuss the report. 223
If we take our hypothetical where the ME performs an
autopsy and dies two weeks later, 224 and explore the outcomes,
this seems to be the only logical conclusion. MEs generally
testify, so this is a safeguard against their unavailability through
death, a change of job, or a move. The additional burden to MEs
is minor, especially if they structure the lean portion so it is
simply a part of the larger report. While the loss of opinion and
conclusion to the lean portion of the report is noticeable, what
remains is sufficient to allow both the prosecution and the

223
While the defense in Freycinet did not bring its own expert in, it did have the
opportunity to question the prosecution’s expert who linked the report to the
defendant. See Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d at 42, 892 N.E.2d at 846, 862 N.Y.S.2d at 453
(“[The autopsy] report did not directly link defendant to the crime. The report is
concerned only with what happened to the victim, not with who killed her.”).
224
See supra Part II.B.
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defendant with the opportunity to confront the facts; and the full
version includes those opinions and conclusions for the benefit of
the family and public health officials.
There are many benefits to adopting the “lean rule” into
practice. For a task that ought not be replicated, it allows
experts to analyze the information that the ME gleaned from the
autopsy in a format that does not excite the rules of evidence.
Similarly, it allows the evidence and the report to survive the ME
and allows it to be used particularly in homicide cases—thus
preventing the formation of an artificial statute of limitations. 225
At the same time, it allows the ME to continue working in a way
that is relatively unimpeded with only a slight format change to
the reporting, as compared to a complete gutting of the report or
absolute inadmissibility, both of which raise fiery policy issues. 226
The “lean rule” has its challenges as well. There still is no
full-scale confrontation of the individual, because it is impossible.
At the same time, it does its best to restrict the kinds of things
that the ME can say from beyond the grave. Also, because the
task cannot be replicated, the results might not satisfy Justice
Scalia. 227 That said, he discarded the ability to verify results as
irrelevant because confrontation by cross-examination is the only
constitutionally valid method of testing the reliability of
evidence, so it may simply be impossible to satisfy him on this
point. 228 Finally, because MEs are on state payroll, Justice Scalia
expressed the idea that the State, by virtue of paying for services,
might influence the outcomes of those services, so the specter of
corruption or an uneven playing field must continue to loom. 229
Another important matter to consider is the idea that any
logical framework that considers the “substantive qualities of
autopsy reports, such as notions that reports are ‘descriptive’ or
‘factual,’ render[ing] them not testimonial,” cannot conform with

See Zabrycki, supra note 177.
Gutting the report would impede the collection of vital statistics and
inadmissibility would show a lack of trust for a process that is so trusted.
227
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2535–36 (2009).
228
See id. at 2536 (“[T]he Constitution guarantees one way [to challenge or
verify results]: confrontation. We do not have license to suspend the Confrontation
Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available.”).
229
Unsurprisingly, and likely because he was discussing analysts and meant to
exclude autopsy reports, Justic Scalia never explicitly considered that doctors might
share the same independence as, for example, judges.
225
226
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Crawford. 230 As an autopsy report stands currently, if it falls
down, it falls down on substantive concepts; however, in this
modified format, it can be reduced to a factual level that is open
for interpretation, which should survive challenges both from
Crawford and from Melendez-Diaz.
In short, the lean format permits the greatest flexibility for
all parties, and it relieves MEs from the concern that they will
not be able to testify on a case because of something far beyond
their control, without imposing a tremendous burden on top of
their already weighty responsibilities. While autopsy reports
should continue to be treated differently from other lab reports
and survive under the Federal Rules of Evidence, in the event
that the parade of horribles described by the dissent in MelendezDiaz 231 begins to march down Main Street, the lean report can
stand by to turn it away at the courthouse steps.
CONCLUSION
Evidentiary rules have provided an avenue for the
introduction of autopsy reports for many years.
The
Confrontation Clause challenge raised in Melendez-Diaz, while
not directly applicable to autopsy reports, has raised the issue
that they may be testimonial. Because of the sharp division of
the Court, and the narrow concurrence in the deciding vote,
courts should be cautious in their application of Melendez-Diaz.
Autopsy reports were only mentioned in footnote five but given
no specific consideration; Justice Thomas concurred on narrow
grounds and mentioned no document that analogizes with them.
This dearth of specific reference should give courts pause before
thrusting autopsy reports into a testimonial and inadmissible
light in the case of the unavailability of the ME. It is far more
preferable and certain to apply Crawford, under which autopsy
reports have been found to be nontestimonial prior to MelendezDiaz, and to carefully measure the analysis performed by the
Court of Appeals of Michigan in King. Under Crawford and in
consideration of confrontation rights, prosecutors should also be

Zabrycki, supra note 177, at 1101.
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Its ruling
has vast potential to disrupt criminal procedures that already give ample protections
against the misuse of scientific evidence.”).
230
231
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encouraged to call forward experts to draw opinions and
conclusions from the autopsy reports and to be subject to crossexamination on those matters.
The unique nature of autopsy reports and the unique policy
interests at play for autopsies require unique treatment.
Autopsies and autopsy reporting are considered public priorities
for health and safety reasons, and also for social reasons. One of
the blessings and the difficulties of an autopsy is that it can only
be performed once. Considerations of humanity for both the
deceased and the survivors are vital to any decision. Our social
policies insist that a body must not be yanked around like a piece
of meat to have the results replicated and confirmed. 232
Similarly, many persons are entitled to an autopsy, paid for by
the state, 233 to allow their survivors closure and to allow their
bodies to be laid to rest without doubt over their passing.
Autopsies are uniquely important and require unique treatment.
For these reasons, MEs throughout the United States should
consider adopting a lean autopsy report structure. MEs can
structure their autopsy reports to divide potentially testimonial
opinions from clearly nontestimonial measurements and
observations. By doing so, in the unfortunate case of an ME’s
demise, the nontestimonial lean portions of the report can be
admitted into evidence and interpreted by an expert, whom the
defendant can confront as to the expert’s testimony and opinions.
Courts can similarly use these guidelines to redact autopsy
reports in the case that the report was not prepared in such a
lean format. 234 This structure preserves the substantive integrity
of autopsy reports for their other uses, permits the ME some
degree of freedom of style, respects the dignity of the deceased,
and honors the constitutional legacy of the Confrontation Clause.
The legal climate surrounding the Confrontation Clause is
uncertain right now, and Melendez-Diaz has played a large role
in muddying the waters. While immediate action may not be the
most prudent step to take, unless the Court responds in drastic

This would also pose a practical difficulty because pieces are gruesomely
adjusted in the process, so the results of a second autopsy would be colored by the
process of the first.
233
This is the case for all of the death scenarios outlined above. See supra note
14.
234
For an effective pre-Melendez-Diaz example, see People v. Freycinet, 11
N.Y.3d 38, 42, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846, 862 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (2008).
232
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fashion to confusion over Melendez-Diaz, 235 prosecutors, MEs and
courts will have to think fast to resolve the difficult challenges
they might face. The proposed approach will hopefully contribute
to the dialogue on this issue and help medicine adapt to today’s
legal realities, while also helping law understand today’s medical
realities.

235
Despite the recent shifts in the composition of the Court, this seems unlikely
after the Court’s recent non-ruling in Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010).

